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Darwin’s first postulate was that the tendency of all organisms to 
increase in numbers will inevitably outstrip resources [1], pp. 4, 63. 
With resource limitation, there is a competition between types for 
limited resources or what Darwin called the struggle for existence. 
Darwin reasoned that the most severe form of competition, leading 
to displacement of one type by another, would occur within species. 
Thus, Darwin identified the species as the evolving population. Dar-
win also reasoned that because the types of organisms competing 
with each other belong to the same species, their variations would 
be slight, and modifications of form and function gradual. Darwin 
explained the origin of complex traits with models that conceptu-
ally break them into simpler components, and then chart their his-
torical evolution [9–11]. By creating a historical theory for origins, 
which uses natural selection as a force acting for immediate benefits 
and through slight and successive modifications, Darwin advanced 
biology far beyond the teleological theories of Aristotle and Paley, 
which assumed that complex traits originate for their ultimate ap-
parent functions [11–15]. Some of Darwin’s contemporaries thus 
recognized that Darwin’s theory “demolished” [16], or dealt a 
“death blow”, to teleological thinking in biology [17]; [18], p. 330. 
How exactly did Darwinism challenge teleology? Accord-
ing to Darwin’s logic, complex traits do not originate for the ultimate 
design purpose they appear to serve, as would be the case if they were 
intentionally designed by a Creator who planned every detail of ex-
istence [11–13, 15]. Instead, the course of evolution is determined by 
simple laws and the deterministic force of natural selection. Darwin 
[19], p. 51 noted that it was less derogatory to the Creator if He had 
formulated several simple laws, rather than each parasite and preda-
tor independently. More importantly for scientific questions, howev-
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Under Darwin’s theory of evolution by natural selection, all beauty and 
wonder in nature comes from the diversity of life, ultimately created 
by a single evolutionary force. Darwin captured his sense of beauty 
with a powerful metaphor. Imagining himself sitting on the edge of a 
tangled bank, Darwin contemplated how a multitude of organic forms 
could have been derived from simple laws acting around him: growth 
with reproduction, inheritance, variability, and a struggle for exis-
tence leading to natural selection [1]. Within these laws, Darwin in-
voked natural selection as the only deterministic force (deterministic 
because it is both non-random and assumes the causes of events come 
before rather than after events). According to Darwin, natural selec-
tion causes slight modifications of form, function, and instinct that 
adapt a species to its immediate environment. Over time, evolution 
by natural selection leads to the origin of new complex structures and 
instincts, divergence of character, and the gradual change of species. 
On the historical backdrop of the dominant scientific de-
bates of the time, the theory of natural selection created a dilemma. 
On the one hand, it suggested that all species had ultimately descend-
ed from one or a few forms. This suggested that major progressive 
patterns of evolution, as assumed by Lamarck [2] but contended 
by Lyell [3], were a real aspect of the history of life [4], pp. 337, 
356. On the other hand, it did not explain long-term trends of in-
creasing complexity or diversity. In recognition of this, Lyell wrote 
to Darwin and encouraged him to allow the possibility that natural 
selection was not the only guiding force and to “modestly limit the 
pretensions of selection” [5]. Darwin replied by arguing that natu-
ral selection was the only force and that Lyell invoked “miraculous 
additions” [6, 7]. To Darwin’s objections, Lyell responded,  “I care 
not for Creation, but I want something higher than Selection” [8]. 
Darwin’s theory of evolution by natural selection does not predict long-term progress or advancement, nor does it 
provide a useful way to define or understand these concepts. Nevertheless, the history of life is marked by major 
trends that appear progressive, and seemingly more advanced forms of life have appeared. To reconcile theory and 
fact, evolutionists have proposed novel theories that extend natural selection to levels and time frames not justified 
by the original structure of Darwin’s theory. To extend evolutionary theory without violating the most basic tenets of 
Darwinism, I here identify a separate struggle and an alternative evolutionary force. Owing to the abundant free energy 
in our universe, there is a struggle for supremacy that naturally rewards those that are first to invent novelties that 
allow exploitation of untapped resources. This natural reward comes in form of a temporary monopoly, which is granted 
to those who win a competitive race to innovate. By analogy to human economies, natural selection plays the role of 
nature’s inventor, gradually fashioning inventions to the situation at hand, while natural reward plays the role of nature’s 
entrepreneur, choosing which inventions to first disseminate to large markets. Natural reward leads to progress through 
a process of invention-conquest macroevolution, in which the dual forces of natural selection and natural reward create 
and disseminate major innovations. Over vast time frames, natural reward drives the advancement of life by a process of 
extinction-replacement megaevolution that releases constraints on progress and increases the innovativeness of life. 
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er, Darwin’s method provided a way to explain complexity. For traits 
of moderate complexity, in which subparts originated for a singular 
purpose (e.g., vision), Darwin’s approach was important for drawing 
attention to the mechanistic ways traits are co-opted from previous 
functions [9, 10, 20]. For traits of extreme complexity, Darwin’s ap-
proach showed how subparts can originate for diverse purposes and 
only incidentally have long-term effects as part of a whole. By break-
ing complex traits into simpler components and charting historical 
evolution, Darwin’s approach uniquely identifies the causes for origins 
[9, 11, 21, 22], which may be different from ultimate effects [23–26].
Lacking many detailed examples, Darwin emphasized a 
principle that would guide historical inquiry. He stressed that natu-
ral selection acts only by the accumulation of slight modifications 
of structure or instinct, each profitable to the individual under its 
conditions of life [1], pp. 170, 233, 235, 435. Darwin also empha-
sized that natural selection produces only relative perfection and that 
true wonder is why imperfection is not more commonly observed 
[1], p. 472. Darwin [1], p. 133 also stated that natural selection, 
though sometimes leading to advancement, includes no necessary 
law of advancement—and could just as easily lead to retrogres-
sion [1], p. 137. Darwin thus encouraged an approach that focuses 
on slight and successive modifications that build complex traits.
Darwin’s theory thus advanced biology past former teleo-
logical theories [12, 15]. However, it did not answer the prevailing 
question of the day. In Darwin’s time, the great science was geology, 
and the major question was whether life had progressed with time 
[27–29]. Darwin’s theory required that life had increased in diver-
sity and complexity, but did Darwin’s theory explain these appar-
ently progressive trends? To make his theory relevant to progress 
in general, Darwin argued that species going extinct would tend to 
have an inferiority held in common [1], pp. 321–322, 327, 344, that 
natural selection causes newer forms to supplant their less-improved 
ancestors [1], pp. 5, 108, 119, 126, etc., and that those from newer 
epochs tend to beat and exterminate those from previous epochs 
[1], p. 337. Darwin also sometimes suggested that natural selection 
would necessarily lead to progress towards perfection [1], p. 489. 
In making these arguments, however, Darwin contradicted himself 
and Lyell, a long-time critic of naïve progressionism, was quick to 
point out the logical inconsistencies [5]. As an early harbinger of 
this situation, Darwin remarked to Hooker [30], “With respect to 
‘highness’ & ‘lowness,’ my ideas are only eclectic & not very clear”. 
          How microevolution 
                became “the whole truth”
Almost a century after Darwin first proposed his theory, Dobzhansky 
[31] began the third edition of his famous Genetics and the Origin 
of Species by stating that, “Simpson’s Tempo and Mode in Evolution 
[32] and Meaning of Evolution [33] ended the belief…that paleontol-
ogy has discovered some mysterious ‘macroevolution’ which is inex-
plicable in the light of the known principles of genetics”. The defini-
tion of macroevolution included the origin of highly complex traits, 
higher taxonomic categories, and the major superspecific trends [34], 
p. 291. In contrast, microevolution involves changes of demes or spe-
cies [31, 34]. Dobzhansky [31], p. 17 then went on to identify “the 
known genetics principles” to include mutation, selection, and ge-
netic drift, and he argued that the works of Simpson and others found 
nothing in macroevolutionary phenomena that would require other 
than the known genetic principles for causal explanation. Dobzhan-
sky proposed that the methods of experimental genetics are limited to 
differences at lower taxonomic levels, and therefore that macroevo-
lutionary phenomena can be understood only as inferred from mi-
croevolutionary genetic processes. Following Dobzhansky, authors 
asked whether microevolutionary genetic processes are sufficient to 
explain macroevolution, or whether it is necessary to postulate other 
1. Resource limitation
2. Struggle for existence
3. Natural selection
4. Survival of the fittest
6. Origin of complex traits through 
    slight and successive modifications
5. Adaptive modification
Figure 1. Framework of the theory of natural selection.
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“genetic factors” [35] p. 1; [36] p. 969; [37], p. 475. This posing of the 
question led to a focus on microevolutionary genetics and a distrac-
tion away from other deterministic forces. Most modern evolution-
ists, including those advocating alternative theories, have assumed 
natural selection is the only deterministic evolutionary force [37–43].
Two ideas reinforced the assumption that macroevolution 
is simply microevolution continued into vast expanses of time [44], 
p. 305; [35], p. 1. The first was Dobzhansky’s [31] extremely influ-
ential [45] description of the adaptive landscape. In Dobzhansky’s 
[31] hands, natural selection became a force that optimizes whole 
organisms to their ecological niches [38], pp. 526–527 and [46], pp. 
xxxv–xxxviii. Particularly, Dobzhansky [31], p. 9 conceptualized 
an adaptive landscape with peaks representing species, and natural 
selection causing peak climbing via an increase of adaptive value. 
Dobzhansky’s adaptive landscape allowed a smooth extrapolation 
from microevolution to macroevolution because it suggested that 
complex traits originate for an ultimate purpose. Likewise, the sec-
ond novel theory applied natural selection directly to long-preserved 
units, like species or genes [38, 39]. This allowed a link between mi-
croevolution and macroevolution because it suggested that complex 
traits are selected for their ultimate effects on long-preserved units. 
Microevolution thus became the whole truth of evolution for 
two reasons. First, Dobzhansky [31] included in “genetic principles” 
natural selection but not other deterministic forces. This led to a focus 
on the genetics of microevolution [36, 37, 44, 47, 48], and distracted 
away from exclusively macroevolutionary forces and processes. Sec-
ond, evolutionists extrapolated from microevolution to macroevolu-
tion, with the idea that complex traits originate for the ultimate effect 
of maximizing fitness or ensuring the survival of long-preserved units 
[31, 38, 39]. In this latter endeavor, however, evolutionists replaced a 
Divine Creator with Natural Selection as a teleological force [49], p. 
2; [50–52]. In making natural selection a teleological force that oper-
ates for final causes [49], however, evolutionists violated the core 
tenets of Darwin’s theory that natural selection works only for im-
mediate benefits and through gradual stepwise processes [9, 12, 15].
                     
               Theory
          Natural reward as force
Despite the inherent contradiction within their theory, evolutionists 
expressed extreme confidence in their theory. Stebbins [44], pp. 305–
306, writing on behalf of prominent evolutionists, stated they could 
not imagine the appearance of new facts that would overthrow their 
conclusion that macroevolution is simply microevolution over long 
time periods (among other conclusions). However, Darwin’s theory 
assumed resource limitation, and the vast majority of the sun’s pow-
er, which historically fueled the expansion of life on earth, remains 
unexploited by life (the sun emits 3.7 x 1026 W [53] and only 1.8 x 
1016 W strikes the earth’s outer atmosphere [54]). The sun is, more-
over, by modern estimates, just one of a trillion stars in the Milky 
Way [55], and the Milky Way is but one of two trillion galaxies in 
the observable universe [56]. An exhaustive discussion of how much 
energy life on earth uses relative to that which strikes the earth is 
unnecessary to realize that the total state of nature is a vast over-
flow of free energy rather than resource limitation. Thus, Darwin’s 
framework (Fig. 1) is not the only one possible. An alternative frame-
work has an assumption of resource abundance at its base (Fig. 2). 
The skeletal outline of an alternative theory is simple 
(Fig. 2). Resource abundance rewards those that are the first to in-
vent or disseminate traits required to exploit those resources. Thus, 
resource abundance leads to a struggle for economic power or 
dominance sensu [57], p. 207; [58], p. 199. I call this struggle the 
struggle for supremacy; see also [59], p. 226. Under the struggle 
for supremacy, the first forms to innovate are naturally rewarded 
with monopoly profit. The inevitable consequence of natural re-
ward is an expansion of life to utilize new resources, and thus 
growth of the natural economy. Over vast time scales, as life ex-
pands or previous life forms go extinct, natural reward favors forms 
more capable of originating and disseminating novelties allow-
ing resource capture. I argue that natural reward is a force of na-
ture separate from natural selection, and that natural reward leads 
to the increased innovativeness or advancement of life with time. 
What form of competition ensues when organisms are 
competing to exploit untapped resources? To answer this ques-
tion, I note that the first form to exploit a wholly new resource 
zone will have a first-mover advantage, which prevents other forms 
from evolving into those places [32, 33, 60–65]. For example, 
the first form that expands to utilize a new resource will typically 
gain an incumbent advantage [61, 66]. This prevents other forms 
from radiating into the resource base [61], p. 206; [67]. Therefore, 
competition ensues as a race to innovate, where innovate means 
invent and disseminate [68]. Thus the struggle for supremacy dif-
fers from the struggle for existence because it is a race to be first, 
in which the winner takes all (Table 1). It is also a competition 
to find new resources, rather than better use those already in use. 
What might we call the form of competition that occurs 
under the struggle for supremacy? Most authors refer to macroevolu-
tion as involving passive replacement rather than active replacement 
[66, 69, 70]. Benton [66], p. 188 used the term weak competition to 
refer passive replacement. In contrast, I use the term indirect compe-
tition for two reasons. First, there is nothing weak about the struggle 
for supremacy. The struggle for supremacy is a struggle for economic 
power. Second, Darwin [1] typically invoked a form of direct compe-
tition in macroevolution, in which the species or higher taxa in com-
petition are simultaneously in the same location and competitively 
exclude each other. Thus, the term indirect competition contrasts to 
direct competition because it does not assume the higher groups in 
competition simultaneously reign supreme; rather, they are in a race 
to conquer (this use of indirect competition is not to be confused with 
apparent competition in ecology, nor is resource abundance on a large 
scale to be confused with a temporary overflow of nutrients or food). 
To pay tribute to the importance of the struggle for su-
premacy, I identify natural reward as a second deterministic force of 
evolution. I use the term reward because it is often used to denote the 
supernormal monopoly profits earned by innovators in human econo-
mies (Table 2). To identify natural reward as a force, I dispense with 
the convention, implied by the neoDarwinian theory, that the envi-
ronmental and physical causes of differential fitness are the forces of 
evolution that cause natural selection [71], pp. 13–17, 31. Instead, I 
assume natural selection and natural reward are forces of nature that 
both manifest their effects through differential organismal reproduc-
tive success. I refer to natural reward as a deterministic force because 
it, like natural selection, is non-random and assumes that the causes 
of events are antecedent. For example, natural reward assumes the 
causes for origin of inventions come before the causes for success.
In relaxing the assumption of resource limitation, it is im-
portant to keep in mind that in physical terms, the earth is an open 
thermodynamic system, which draws energy from outside [72]. Al-
though most proximate opportunities for expansion will stem from 
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the opening of new niches or extinctions on earth, ultimately the un-
tapped energy from the sun allows opportunities to continually arise. 
Moreover, the only thing holding life back from nearly indefinite 
expansion is its ability to innovate. For example, the vast majority 
of the sun’s power remains unexploited because no life form has yet 
invented or disseminated the novelties required to more fully exploit 
it [73]. At the same time, this also means that the power of popula-
tion alone is insufficient to ensure resources are exploited. Organ-
isms must invent or disseminate the novelties necessary to exploit 
novel resources, otherwise those resources will remain unexploited. 
I therefore conceptualize the struggle for existence as oc-
curring between alleles within species. This is consistent with the 
standard neoDarwinian conceptualization of microevolution as al-
lele frequency change [74–76], and Darwin’s argument that the 
struggle for existence is most severe within species [1], pp. 68, 75, 
76, 121, 320, 468. I conceptualize the struggle for supremacy, in 
contrast, as a race between gene complexes. The gene complex that 
wins the race to innovate will give rise to a higher taxon and may 
be revealed in its core genetic regulatory network [77]. The loser 
will not be seen. Thus, competition is between potential alternatives, 
and these alternatives represent gene complexes (Table 1). Natural 
selection thus results in survival of the optimized alleles [26], while 
natural reward results in success of the innovative gene complexes 
(Table 1). The question posed to the theory of natural reward is how 
these forces interact to determine the grand patterns of evolution.
           Theory of natural reward
Just as Darwin was led to appreciate the importance of natural se-
lection by analogy to the economic theories of Malthus, we may 
appreciate the importance of natural reward by analogy to modern 
theories of macroeconomic growth [78–81]. By analogy, natural se-
lection plays a role similar to an inventor in human economies, while 
natural reward plays the role of entrepreneur. Particularly, natural 
selection gradually tinkers [82] contraptions through a freeflow of 
creativity. Natural selection often combines old things in new ways, 
and gives familiar materials new and unexpected functions. Natural 
selection has no regard for long-term growth or market share and 
uses whatever materials are available to create workable objects 
[82]. Natural reward, in contrast, places useful inventions originated 
by creative tinkering in unexploited markets before potential com-
petitors. By analogy to humanity’s most profitable company, natural 
selection plays Nature’s “Woz,” and natural reward plays Nature’s 
Table 1. The struggles of life.
Struggle for 
Existence
Struggle for 
Supremacy
Resources Limited Unlimited
Resource use Use resources 
already in use
Expansion to new 
resources
Typical form 
of competition
Direct, between co-
existing alternatives
Indirect, race to be first
Typical levels 
of competition
Alleles within 
species 
Gene complexes shared 
by species and higher 
taxa 
Typical 
outcome of 
competition
Survival of the 
optimized
Success of the 
innovative
Figure 2. Framework of the Theory of Natural Reward. The theory of natural reward as-
sumes a similar logical structure of Darwin’s framework, except with an initial assumption of 1. 
resource abundance rather than resource limitation. Everything else follows.  
1. Resource abundance
2. Struggle for 
    supremacy
3. Natural reward
4. Sucess of 
     the innovative
6. Advancement 
5. Progress 
*The term optimized is preferred over fittest (Fig. 1) for two reasons. 
First, it does not result in confusion between adaptedness and reproduc-
tive success. Second, optimized makes a sharp distinction to innovative.
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“Jobs” (Fig. 3). Whereas Woz invented contraptions for non-entre-
preneurial reasons (e.g., to impress his friends [83]), Jobs envisioned 
emerging markets and directed the fine tuning of Woz’s inventions 
to achieve great economic power [84, 85]. A similar distinction be-
tween the inventor and entrepreneur is illustrated by the roles of 
the McDonalds brothers as inventors and Ray Kroc as the entre-
preneur in the origin and spread of the McDonald’s franchise [86]. 
Because the theory of natural reward depends on a dis-
tinction between the inventor and entrepreneur, I provide a simple 
definition of entrepreneurship. The term entrepreneurship has long 
escaped a simple definition because of all the various tasks that 
human entrepreneurs must fulfill. Human entrepreneurs must start 
companies, organize means of production, break down resistance, 
advertise their products, undertake ventures, take risks, and expose 
themselves to uncertainties of prices [93, 94]. I define entrepre-
neurship as the act of disseminating inventions. This definition of 
entrepreneurship has three attractive qualities. First, it allows a link 
to nature where the entrepreneurial role of spreading inventions 
also occurs. Second, this definition of entrepreneurship allows for a 
simple definition of innovation. If entrepreneurship is the act of dis-
seminating inventions, then innovation is the combination of inven-
tion (the act of inventing) and entrepreneurship (Fig. 3). Everything 
else carried out by human entrepreneurs is incidental. Third, this 
definition of entrepreneurship allows for a simple prediction. In hu-
man societies, the successful entrepreneur not only makes himself 
rich; he also makes the inventors with whom he is associated rich 
(assuming enforcement of patent laws). Steve Jobs, by disseminat-
ing Woz’s inventions, made himself and Woz rich [83]. In turn, we 
expect natural reward, acting as nature’s entrepreneur, to favor the 
success of the innovative—and this includes both the inventive and 
entrepreneurial qualities in organic life (e.g., traits involved with 
evolvability and disseminating inventions; see below).
In making this analogy between natural reward and 
human entrepreneurs, I do not imply that gene networks have 
foresight, as human entrepreneurs sometimes do. Instead, I suggest 
that gene networks evolve to behave as if they have foresight. Two 
forms of foresight may, moreover, be expected. A first form is that 
which allows organisms to anticipate specific threats experienced 
by the species in the past. An example of this form of apparent 
foresight is CRISPR-Cas mechanisms of immunity in bacteria 
[95]. This allows an organism to anticipate a threat that its ances-
tors previously encountered [96]. Such a foresight behavior could 
originate by standard microevolution by natural selection for that 
purpose, because it involves adaptation to a particular niche. It may 
also be favored by natural reward, if it allows population expansion. 
A second form of apparent foresight allows individuals in a species 
to exploit new niches, not previously encountered by the species. 
This form of foresight may not be expected to originate by natural 
selection for the purpose of exploiting new niches; however, it may 
be favored by natural reward for this reason. This second form 
of apparent foresight reflects the intangible quality of successful 
human entrepreneurs. Because new markets are difficult to predict, 
this latter form of apparent foresight may involve general strate-
gies for adapting, exploring, and discovering, rather than specific 
anticipated responses ([90, 91] and Table 2). 
If natural selection and natural reward can both operate 
through the intermediary of organismal reproductive success, how 
do they interact to produce the grand patterns of life’s history? To 
answer this question, I first establish assumptions on the units of 
evolution. Under the theory of natural reward, the unit of force is 
the gene complex, the unit of reproduction is the organism, and the 
unit of competition is the allele or gene complex. Thus, a force, 
natural selection or natural reward, operates on a unit, normally the 
gene complex, and when the power of the force overpowers random 
effects determining organismal reproductive success, the optimized 
alleles survive or innovative gene complexes succeed. 
How do natural selection and natural reward interact? I 
suggest they interact in two ways. First, through a process of inven-
tion-conquest macroevolution, which may occur on a time frame of 
1 to 10 million years for most macroorganisms [63], they fill new 
ecological niches. Because the only way to avoid extinction in the 
long term is to increase population size, I refer to such population 
Spread of
Inventions
Innovation
JobsWoz
Origin of 
inventions
Natural Selection
Natural Reward
Inventor Entrepreneur
Figure 3. The components of innovation. Under the theory of natural reward, by analogy to humanity’s 
most profitable company, natural selection plays the role of Nature’s inventor (Woz), while natural reward 
plays the role of Nature’s entrepreneur (Jobs).
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Person Statement Comment Refs
Queen 
Elizabeth I
At his suit: it is right that inventors should be rewarded and protected 
against others making profit out of their discoveries.
Early law conveying a reward for 
innovation in human culture *.
[87]
R. Cantillon Then the Merchants or Entrepreneurs of the Market Towns will buy at a 
low price the products of the Villages and will have them carried to the 
Capital to be sold there at a higher price: and this difference of price will 
necessarily pay for the upkeep of the Horses and Menservants and the profit 
of the Entrepreneur...
First use of the term entrepreneur 
also highlights the basic function: 
to spread inventions.
[88], p. 151
J. B. Say In manufacture…if success ensue, the entrepreneur is rewarded by a 
longer period of exclusive advantage, because his process is less open to 
observation. In some places, too, the exclusive advantage is protected by 
patents of invention.
Establishes a link between the 
entrepreneur and the reward for 
innovation.
 [89], p. 84
J. Schumpeter We have seen that the function of entrepreneurs is to reform or 
revolutionize the pattern of production by exploiting an invention or, 
more generally, an untried technological possibility for producing a new 
commodity or producing an old one in a new way … This function does not 
essentially consist in either inventing anything or otherwise creating…
Distinguishes the role of the 
inventor and entrepreneur, and 
explains what the entrepreneur 
does.
[80], p. 132
…there is or may be an element of genuine monopoly gain in those 
entrepreneurial profits which are the prizes.
Suggests that the entrepreneur’s 
goal is to gain monopoly profits.
[80], p. 102
F. Knight …the innovator himself cannot predict the results in advance, or even be 
sure that the innovation will not be a failure, and consequently the activity 
is connected with "risk-taking"… the entrepreneur is simply a specialist in 
risk-taking or uncertainty bearing.
Recognizes that entrepreneurship 
usually involves risk. 
[90], p. 129
C. Christensen Markets that do not exist cannot be analyzed: Suppliers and customers 
must discover them together.  Not only are the market applications for 
disruptive technologies unknown at the time of their development, they 
are unknowable.  The strategies and plans that managers formulate for 
confronting disruptive technological change, therefore, should be plans 
for learning and discovery rather than plans for execution.  This is an 
important point to understand, because managers who believe they know 
a market’s future will plan and invest very differently from those who 
recognize the uncertainties of a developing market.
Explains general strategies of 
entrepreneurs that may help manage 
risk effectively. 
[91], p. 129
Aghion and 
Howitt
Innovation is a vital source of long-run growth, and the reward for 
innovation is monopoly profit, which comes from being able to do 
something that your rivals haven't yet been able to match.
Statement capturing the link 
between the reward for innovation 
and economic growth.
[81], p. 7
M. Sanders If commercialization is not assumed to be trivial and the entrepreneur 
captures the rents of commercialization, these rents are a reward for 
bearing the risk and making the effort to turn an opportunity into a product 
and organizing production.
Highlights the link between 
entrepreneurial risk and reward.
[92], p. 341
Table 2. Examples of terms relevant to the theory of natural reward (bold). 
*Laws are necessary in human culture because imitation or theft of invention is possible [89], p. 131.
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expansion as progress. I use the term progress because long-term 
population expansion decreases the probability of extinction relative 
to population decline [1, 97, 98]. At the very minimum, the basic 
point of life is to avoid extinction and so population expansion is 
progressive. For those who argue the basic point of life is to ex-
pand [57, 58], the same definition of progress is relevant. Excep-
tions may be meaningful only for entities that have transitioned to 
immortality or invincibility, or for those who believe the purpose 
of life is to go extinct. Because there is no evidence of the former 
and the latter should probably not exist (though it might), I proceed 
with a notion of progress as expansion. This also conforms to com-
mon opinions on what is meant by “economic progress”, though 
short-term growth of human economies should not be viewed as 
progressive if such growth leads to long-term decline or extinction.
Second, through a process of extinction-replacement mega-
evolution, which occurs on the order of 50 to 150 million years for 
macroorganisms [99, 100], natural reward and natural selection inter-
act to release constraints on progress and increase the overall innova-
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selective optimization
Figure 4. Invention-conquest macroevolution. Natural selection can lead to extinction or expansion but natural reward only favors expan-
sion. A two-dimensional innovation landscape in which the Y axis represents three discrete states of population growth and the X axis repre-
sents the amount of cooperation. At point marked by an asterisk, the population may increase in cooperation by moving to the left, or decrease 
in cooperation by moving to the right. Moving to the left will lead to the origin of novelties and population expansion. Moving to the right will 
lead to the loss of novelties, population decline and extinction. Which occurs depends on the population structure. (A) The population is clone 
structured, meaning that individuals only encounter clonemates during the part of the life cycle when cooperation is possible (but mating is 
random). Payoffs to alleles coding for indiscriminate strategies on the left (rows) in populations where strategies on the right (columns) are 
common. Here, alleles coding for cooperation receive a cooperate-cooperate payoff, and alleles coding for defection receive a defect-defect 
payoff. The evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) is then to cooperate despite the prisoner’s dilemma at the level of individuals (note: payoffs 
are to alleles, and depend on interactions between individuals. Interactions between individuals of different strategies do not occur in clone-
structured populations, so allele payoffs can be different than individual payoffs. The payoff for alleles in B, which conforms to a standard 
prisoner’s dilemma, applies to individuals in A and B). (B) The population is well mixed so that clones frequently interact with other clones. 
Here, alleles coding for defection will sometimes gain a defect-cooperate payoff, and alleles coding for cooperation will sometimes receive a 
cooperate-defect payoff. Consequently, the ESS is defect. With every evolutionary step, natural selection (N.S.) increases gene optimization 
value +3, independently of whether the population is heading toward expansion or extinction (see payoffs at right).
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tiveness of life. By analogy, a scientific system progresses when it in-
vents models or makes key discoveries that increase the total domain 
of knowledge, e.g., every 5–20 years; but it advances when a new core 
theoretical framework allows the theory to become a more potent en-
gine of exploration and discovery, e.g., every 50–200 years [92, 101]. 
Before getting to this prediction for advancement, however, I will first 
focus on how invention-conquest macroevolution results in progress.
To explain how natural reward produces progress, I first 
give a two-dimensional innovation landscape in Fig. 4. This figure 
focuses on cooperation as a model. I focus particularly on coop-
eration because at each level of biological organization—unicellu-
lar, multicellular, and colonial—cooperation among close relatives 
helped facilitate the origin of other innovations, including those in-
volved with transmitting information across generations [102–105], 
and various other traits allowing expansion into new habitats [106–
108]. The cooperation among cells was necessary for the evolution 
of specialized cell types, the evolution of diversified organs, and 
multicellular organisms of large size and complexity [109]. A high 
degree of cooperation and mutual cohesion at one level was, more-
over, a necessary prerequisite for inclusion into yet higher levels of 
hierarchical organization [110]. Non-cooperation, in contrast, does 
not have such long-term effects on expansion. Thus, cooperation is a 
useful model because it was consistently a major innovation, leading 
to some of the biggest ecological expansions in the history of life 
on earth [111, 112], while its alternative, non-cooperation, was not.
In a case where a population is kin structured, natu-
ral selection can easily favor cooperation as shown by the pay-
off matrix in Fig. 4A. This payoff matrix is derived from a stan-
dard prisoner’s dilemma, where high relatedness among associates 
restricts help to those sharing the same genes. In a well-mixed 
population, where individuals often associate with nonkin, how-
ever, natural selection easily favors defection in the absence of 
other mechanisms maintaining cooperation (Fig. 4B). In cases of 
high mixture, cooperators interact with non-cooperators, in which 
case non-cooperators are favored for avoiding the costs of help-
ing others. Thus, natural selection can easily favor either coop-
eration or defection. However, natural reward only favors coopera-
tion as a key innovation (Fig. 4). Thus, only natural reward exerts 
an asymmetric effect on expansion and progress via cooperation.
Fig. 4 thus has three important points. First, it suggests that 
natural selection optimizes only with respect to the extreme short 
term, as represented by minor peaks on an overall slope. This keeps 
in line with Darwin’s argument that natural selection works only 
through slight and successive modifications. It also distinguishes 
Fig. 4 from previous adaptive landscapes, because it suggests that the 
larger peaks do not represent selective optimization. Second, Fig. 4 
shows that natural selection is a blind process that has no regard for fu-
ture benefits of populations. Natural selection can doom populations 
to extinction in both natural [113, 114] and laboratory environments 
[115, 116], for example by overspecializing species [98, 117, 118], or 
by favoring cheating (Fig. 4 and [116]). Third, although evolution by 
natural selection will not always just as easily lead to extinction as suc-
cess, as depicted in Fig. 4, natural selection still is relatively blind to 
the long-term effects of traits it produces. Natural reward, in contrast, 
favors only those traits that allow expansion. In the long term, natu-
ral reward, by differentially favoring novelties that expand popula-
Figure 5. Extinction-replacement megaevolution. A three-dimensional innovation landscape in which (A) in the initial state, lineage 1 wins the race to 
innovate over lineage 2 and conquers a new biological market, going from tier X to tier Y. (B) Lineage 2 now achieves the ability to expand into tier Y, but 
cannot because of the monopoly of lineage 1 already present. (C) Environmental change and mass extinction kills all organisms in tier Y, but lineage 2 remains 
poised to reinvade tier Y. (D) Competing head-to-head, lineage 2 expands faster than lineage 1 and conquers tier Y, also producing more species. (E) Lineage 
2’s invasion of tier Z reveals another tier Z that was never exploited by lineage 1. 
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tions [68], has a highly asymmetric effect on progress and expansion.
Natural reward is a savvy entrepreneur who disseminates 
successful inventions to new markets. After natural reward dissemi-
nates inventions, natural selection will often fine tune inventions for 
their new or expanded roles. Because natural selection plays a role as 
originator and finisher, it might appear that all fit between organism 
and environment is caused by natural selection alone. It is important 
to remember, however, that natural reward plays a crucial role in cre-
ating a match between organism and its environment. Natural reward 
creates this fitness by disseminating particular traits to the environ-
ments for which they happen to be fitted to exploit. Natural selection 
is expected initially only to manage with available odds and ends, with 
no special project [82], to produce contraptions [119]. Contraptions 
are distinguished from contrivances because their various subparts 
were not all uniquely and expressly chosen with a particular final goal 
in mind, but are the result of jury-rigging of available materials [38] 
p. 120. A major effect of natural reward disseminating inventions is 
to make contraptions appear as if they are contrivances. This is im-
portant to note, because many evolutionists have taken apparent con-
trivance as evidence of natural selection as a teleological agent [49, 
50, 120], rather than natural selection and natural reward working to-
gether (and whereas in human culture entrepreneurs often usurp cred-
it for the inventor’s work [85, 86], evolutionists often give the inven-
tor credit for the entrepreneur’s work in organic evolution instead). 
The two-dimensional innovation landscape presented 
in Fig. 4 and the foregoing discussion explains the roles of natu-
ral selection and natural reward in facilitating expansion. How-
ever, under the struggle for supremacy, the rewards go to those 
who are first to innovate. Thus, if one lineage expands and con-
quers an environment, it can be difficult or impossible for another 
to later invade because of the incumbent advantage. If the win-
ner is based on a fundamentally constrained genetic system, mo-
nopoly may stifle progress. How, then, are constraints on prog-
ress lifted, so that life may become more innovative with time?
I now present a three-dimensional innovation landscape. 
In contrast to Fig. 4, which explains only the relatively short-term 
process of invention-conquest macroevolution, Fig. 5 shows a lon-
ger-term process of extinction-replacement megaevolution. Fig. 5 
Resource
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Microevolution
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Figure 6. Comparison of theories of natural selection and natural reward. (A) The theory of natural selection includes A 
only. (B) The theory of natural reward includes A and B, as well as the connection between them.
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focuses only on inventions leading uphill toward expansion, thus 
taking an asymmetric focus on innovation. Fig. 5, in turn, shows four 
things. First, the initial lineage to conquer an environment can usurp 
the market share and prevent invasion by others. As shown in Fig. 
5A, lineage 1 is the first to win the race to innovate, while lineage 2 
only later becomes capable of invading the environment denoted tier 
Y. However, the prior presence of lineage 1 prevents conquest by lin-
eage 2 even after lineage 2 invents the novelties that would allow it to 
invade a vacant tier Y (Fig. 5B). Second, mass extinction puts poten-
tial competitors in the struggle for supremacy back on equal footing 
(Fig. 5C). This allows lineage 2 to conquer the initial tier Y after mass 
extinction of lineage 1. Third, some of lineage 1 carries over to fill a 
small region of tier Y (Fig. 5D). Thus, a former incumbent can retain 
some market share. Fourth, lineage 2 more fully fills tier X than lineage 
1 formerly did, as represented by more peaks. Lineage 2 is also able to 
conquer a wholly new resource zone represented by tier Z (Fig. 5E).
Why would new species, reinvading following the extinc-
tion of incumbents, however, be more capable of expanding into a 
new tier Z as depicted in Fig. 5? The main reason is that any form 
better at dispersing and radiating into the initial tier Y might also be 
more likely to invade a novel tier Z. However, this raises the ques-
tion of why there might be a form better able to radiate back into 
tier Y, after lineage 1 has held the monopoly for so long. One pos-
sibility is that for the period within which a particular dynasty reigns 
supreme, there will always be evolution going on at the marginal 
fringes that may be capable of producing a more innovative genetic 
system. After an extinction event, the existing variation in innova-
tive capacity is acted upon by natural reward. Thus it may be gener-
ally assumed that after sufficient time, the form with the incumbent 
advantage may not strictly be the best—it retained monopoly only 
because it was first. Extinction, by leveling the playing field, re-
veals latent variation in innovative capacity in the whole population. 
We are now in a position to compare the basic differences 
between the theory of natural selection and natural reward (Fig. 6). 
Under the theory of natural selection, which assumes a single de-
terministic force, the broad-scale course of evolution proceeds as 
repeated bouts of phyletic microevolution (Fig. 6). The necessary 
implication is that, even if evolution is a history of key innovations 
[105], the broad-scale course of evolution is one arbitrary thing after 
another [121]. The theory of natural reward, in contrast, provides a 
connection between microevolution and macroevolution by viewing 
natural selection as a creative process that produces complex inven-
tions that are the fodder for the struggle for supremacy (Fig. 6). The 
struggle for supremacy leads to invention-conquest macroevolution, 
and following climate change and extinction, extinction-replacement 
megaevolution. Natural reward, by differentially favoring inventions 
that exploit untapped resources, provides directionality to evolution-
ary history. Over vast time frames, natural reward leads to an in-
crease of overall innovativeness, and thus the advancement of life.
               Unifying power
A main prediction of the theory of natural reward is that traits that 
allow capture of untapped resources will allow population expan-
sion. The idea that novelties allowing exploitation of new resourc-
es allow population expansion has figured prominently in former 
discussion of innovation, adaptive radiation, and the energetics of 
evolution [32, 33, 60–66, 68, 122]. The basic concept has also been 
demonstrated in laboratory experiments [123, 124]. Evolutionists 
in these cases typically assumed that novel opportunities provided 
a “selective pressure” for expansion. However, the typical form of 
competition is indirect between higher taxa, rather than direct within 
species [32, 33, 60–66]. According to the theory of natural reward, 
the force involved is natural reward. But this raises the question: why 
not just call it natural selection? What additional insights are gleaned 
by realizing natural reward is a separate macroevolutionary force? 
A first example showing the unifying power of the theory 
of natural reward is why sexual reproduction is widespread [125–
128]. Because natural selection works only for short-term benefits, 
the problem has involved identifying a short-term advantage to sex 
or the subcomponent traits of which sex is formed. This allows a 
division of the problem of sex into two parts: why sex originated 
[129, 130], and why sex is maintained [131–133]. The former prob-
lem is one of deep time and requires explaining the origin of cell fu-
sion, separate sexes, diploidy, two-step meiosis, recombination, and 
so on [129, 130]. The latter problem requires identifying short-term 
selective advantage to sex that explains why sexual populations are 
not overtaken by asexuals. Hypotheses to explain the maintenance 
of sex include those focused on genetic benefits of speeding adapta-
tion or breaking apart negative genetic associations [125, 126], spe-
cialization or division of labor [134, 135], parasite resistance [132], 
or purging of deleterious mutations [133]. Arguments focused on 
the origin or maintenance of sex, however, give the impression that 
some essential feature of the situation is being overlooked [136]. 
What is being overlooked? The theory of natural reward 
suggests it is the match between question and answer. The question 
usually asked is why sexual reproduction is widespread, and the an-
swer given is why sex originated or is maintained [125–128]. The 
theory of natural reward uses natural selection to explain origin and 
maintenance, and natural reward to explain success. Questions of 
success are different, moreover, because they focus on incidental 
consequences. For example, sex could be widespread because of its 
effects on hybridization and introgression, which contribute to inva-
sion of novel habitats [137–141]; because it allowed the spread of 
selfish genetic elements, which ultimately contribute to gene regula-
tory network evolution and novelty [142–147]; or because sex allows 
sexual selection, which lead to the evolution of weaponry [148–150], 
and (possibly) large brains [151, 152]. Any such long-term conse-
quences of sex could lead to a greater net diversification rate for sex-
uals, which would cause sex to become widespread [153, 154]. Cru-
cially, when one separates cause and effect, it is possible to entertain 
many possible hypotheses that could contribute to the ubiquity of sex. 
Similarly, those who focused on the ubiquity of coopera-
tion typically focused narrowly on particular genetic hypotheses for 
why cooperation originated or is maintained [111, 112, 155–157]. 
To explain why cooperation is widespread, it is important to fo-
cus on long-term effects. Cooperation may have numerous long-
term effects that vary between taxa. The most important effect of 
cooperation may have been in allowing the evolution of heredity 
[103–105]. More commonly, cooperation may have allowed new 
interactions with the external environment that vary between taxa 
[106, 107, 107–110]. In social amoebae, cooperation between differ-
entiated cells allows a stalk useful for dispersing spores [158, 159]. 
In vampire bats, cooperation between non-differentiated individu-
als allows survival through cold nights [160]. How important were 
these traits for ecological success? No model for the maintenance 
of cooperation [157] will fully answer this question. To understand 
why cooperation succeeds in a particular case, it is important to un-
derstand the natural history of the traits that cooperation allows, and 
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how these traits interact with the environment [106, 107, 158, 159]. 
Traits enhancing the spread of inventions, likewise, were 
not previously included within the same explanatory framework. 
This is shown, for example, by a recent attempt to bring traits en-
hancing dispersal into the overall conceptual umbrella of modern 
evolutionary theory. Particularly, Shine et al. [161], argued that traits 
enhancing dispersal are significant because they cause changes of 
phenotypes in space even in the absence of differential reproductive 
success. They referred to this phenomenon as spatial sorting. How-
ever, the theory of natural reward suggests that traits enhancing dis-
persal are important because they disseminate inventions to exploit 
untapped resources, thus causing large population expansions. In this 
sense, their ubiquity is an indicator of natural selection’s bold and en-
trepreneurial associate, natural reward (Fig. 3; not natural selection’s 
“shy younger sibling” [158]). In contrast to spatial sorting, which can 
occur in the absence of differential reproductive success (or conceiv-
ably without reproduction at all), natural reward depends on differ-
ential reproductive success (and reproduction) of dispersing forms. 
To apply the theory of natural reward to the phenomena 
that Shine et al. [161] describe, consider their description of cane 
toads with longer legs. These individuals were capable of dispersing 
more rapidly, but the longer legs caused spinal injuries. From the per-
spective of the theory of natural reward, this would suggest that lon-
ger legs would be favored under the struggle for supremacy, as long 
as opportunities for expansion persist, but not by natural selection 
under the struggle for existence, once expansion ceases. Shine et al.’s 
[161] review of similar traits can also be seen as collecting traits that 
are differentially favored by natural reward (e.g., behaviors causing 
individuals to attach themselves to other species like burrs and ticks, 
seeds and fruits in digestive tracts or human vehicles, bold risk-tak-
ing behavior, and the ability to handle the stresses of intense physi-
cal activity [161]). Shine et al. [161]  did not see the more general 
importance of dispersal traits, nor did they unify them with evolv-
ability traits, because they did not realize that natural reward could 
operate through differential reproductive success to favor expansion. 
More generally, under the theory of natural reward, the role 
of entrepreneurship, or disseminating inventions, is not restricted to 
traits allowing dispersal through space. Natural reward can also favor 
traits allowing dispersal through time. Examples of time-dispersal 
traits include hardy cysts, seeds, or diapause stages, or stochastic phe-
notype switching traits [162–166]. Models show that time-dispersal 
traits can allow survival through major environmental catastrophes 
and thus differential population expansion [165–168]. Another trait 
that may allow dispersal through time is facultative parthenogenesis 
based on cues like the absence of mates or stress [169–172]. This 
ability to reproduce asexually based on cues could allow species to 
survive major catastrophes, like floods or volcanic eruptions [173]. 
Natural reward may also favor traits that allow spa-
tial and temporal diffusion of novelties, but which are not classic 
space or time dispersal traits. One such trait is the near universal 
genetic code [174]. One scenario to explain the initial fixation of 
a single genetic code is that some life forms specializing on the 
use of an initially abundant code gained access to larger pools of 
protein innovations [175]. The competition between various life 
forms initially specialized on different codes may thus have been 
a race to innovate, which rewarded those that were the first to 
have specialized on a code that was both abundant and relatively 
useful. In a similar way, a scenario to explain the near fixation of 
a single language for scientific communication is that scientists us-
ing a common language gained access to larger pools of discover-
ies and methods [176, 177]. This could be true even if the language 
chosen was not optimal or even the best among alternatives (e.g., 
English has poor tracking between words and numbers [178, 179]).
By drawing attention to the importance of the dissemi-
nating inventions on expansion, the theory of natural reward uni-
fies standard evolvability traits, involved with the origin of in-
ventions, with traits involved with the spread of inventions. This 
unification also helps show how some simulation studies could be 
taken to support either. Lehman and Miikkulainen [180], for ex-
ample, showed that if a trait increases the probability of exploit-
ing a new niche, it can expand as a consequence of repeated bouts 
of extinction-replacement megaevolution. Although they took 
their results to suggest an increase of evolvability, their simula-
tion can also be taken to predict an increase of dispersal traits as 
well. At least one prior analysis included both sorts of traits in the 
same review [181], consistent with the theory of natural reward.
What are some examples of extinction-replacement mega-
evolution in nature, leading to advancement? One well-known ex-
ample is the initial radiation of the dinosaurs to fill terrestrial envi-
ronments in the Mesozoic, followed by replacement by the mammals 
in the Cenozoic. The initial radiation of dinosaurs would be reflected 
by Fig. 5A, first starting 240 million years ago [182]. By around 200 
mya, however, the mammals had appeared and were beginning to 
evolve the traits that would contribute to their later diversification 
and success [183–185]. It was not until 65 mya, however, that the 
mammals got their chance, following the Chicxulub asteroid impact, 
and a series of volcanic eruptions that annihilated terrestrial animals 
weighing > 50 pounds [186]. At this time, mammals had attained 
some of the general adaptations [183–185] that helped them in a 
struggle for supremacy with the remaining dinosaurs. With the large 
dinosaurs gone, the mammals radiated into the open niches for large 
body size [187] as suggested by Fig. 5D. The dinosaurs did, however, 
retain some market share as birds diversified, analogous to the white 
peak on tier Y in Fig. 5D. The mammals also yielded greater exploita-
tion of marine environments, as suggested by the diversity of ceta-
ceans [188] compared to marine reptiles at the K/T boundary [189]. 
Why would the mammals, reinvading following the extinc-
tion of large dinosaurs, be more innovative? One possibility is that 
for the period within which dinosaurs ruled the earth, mammals were 
evolving various traits that would fortuitously give them a leg up 
on dinosaurs in both surviving a catastrophe and radiating back into 
available niches (dentition, endothermy, intelligence, etc. [183, 185, 
186, 190]). A resulting greater innovative capacity may have increased 
the likelihood that mammals repopulating an environment would 
break into a yet additional tier (Fig. 5E). Mammals indeed invaded a 
wholly new resource zone represented by tier Z, allowed by the hu-
man invention of language [105], mathematics, agriculture, science, 
and economic systems that promote growth [191, 192]. In agreement 
with the theory of natural reward, much of human economic growth 
is driven by technological innovation [81, 193]. The most innovative 
strategies employed by humans are also flexible methods that allow 
exploration and discovery into new fields and markets [91, 194, 195].
More generally, natural reward, acting through the process 
of extinction-replacement megaevolution, is expected to increase in-
novativeness. The strategies expected cause individuals to behave as 
if they know that new opportunities are virtually unpredictable, and 
thus that the best strategies for exploiting opportunities are geared for 
evolving, exploring, and dispersing, rather than strategies for antici-
pating particular threats. This form of apparent foresight deals with 
extreme uncertainty and the problem of predicting emerging markets 
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[91], p. 148; [93], p. 7; [196]. It may be likened to a physical process 
that maximizes the future freedom of action [197], and general scien-
tific methods that rely on primitive but flexible methods [194, 195]. 
Such apparent foresight strategies could be those that deal with either 
the origin or dissemination of inventions (Fig. 3). They might thus 
include general strategies that enhance evolvability or contribute to 
the dispersal or dissemination of inventions through space or time.
                     Anomalies
Here I will explain how the theory of natural reward helps dissolve 
three previous anomalies of evolutionary theory. These include 
punctuated equilibrium, the increase of complexity and diversity 
with time, and the increase of energy flux or power. The first is the 
punctuated equilibrium [38, 198], or the sudden appearance of higher 
taxonomic categories in the fossil record. To explain this phenom-
enon, Simpson [32] hypothesized that higher categories arise fol-
lowing major genetic changes in small, isolated populations. These 
major genetic changes produce the novelties that allow invasion of 
new adaptive zones and speciation. In a review of Simpson’s work, 
Wright accepted Simpson’s argument [199], but later rejected it 
in favor an alternative that assumes  novelties originate gradually 
[174–176]. In Wright’s argument, punctuated equilibrium occurs 
without saltational origin of evolutionary innovations. Wright’s 
gradualistic alternative agrees with the theory of natural reward. 
Wright [174–176] argued that important novelties evolve 
gradually and spread suddenly. According to Wright, sudden spread-
ing is caused either by the origin of a key novelty or movement into 
a new place allowed by migration or extinction of an incumbent. In 
the former case, there is an important role for a final minor change 
pushing a species beyond a threshold necessary to enter some new 
adaptive zone. In the latter case, there is an important role for ef-
fects of a complex trait that have nothing to do with the cause for 
origin. Simpson accepted Wright’s hypothesis and thus assumed 
breakthroughs or “quantum shifts” were not saltational as Simp-
son [32], p. 350 originally argued, involving major change concen-
trated in speciation events. Instead, they involved the same type of 
normal phyletic evolution that occurs at other times. According to 
Simpson [33] pp. 350, 389, what is unusual about traits leading to 
the origin of higher categories is their long-term consequences, not 
their mode of origin, which is what Wright argued. Wright’s argu-
ment is consistent with the theory of natural reward, because it does 
not assume that key innovations originate suddenly as Simpson’s 
[32], Mayr’s [203], and Eldredge and Gould’s hypotheses did [204]. 
The theory of natural reward supports Wright’s argument 
because it distinguishes the roles of natural selection and natural re-
ward (Fig. 3). This allows complex traits to originate without saltation 
and yet have differential long-term impacts. Shifting rates of evolu-
tion are explained because the sudden expansion leads to increased 
rates of evolution as new forms adaptively diversify. This also helps 
explain why new forms often appear suddenly in the fossil record. 
The lineages evolving the novelties are at low density prior to cross-
ing a threshold or extinction of an incumbent, thus leaving few fos-
sils. Once a particular threshold is reached or extinction occurs, inva-
sion of a new adaptive zone is possible. The drastic increase in total 
numbers that accompanies major innovation or extinction means that 
the newly abundant type will more likely be detected in the fossil re-
cord. The finding that novelties originate gradually and yet also lead 
to punctuated bursts of adaptive radiation, with a strong role for inci-
dental effect, is also witnessed in technological evolution [198], p. 6.
How does the theory of natural reward bear on historical 
increases of hierarchical complexity [109] and ecological diversity 
[205]? Previously, some suggested that these increases were largely 
passive, as encapsulated by a “passive diffusion from the left wall” 
[206, 207], or “zero evolutionary force law” [208]. Others suggested 
a more active process that required overcoming constraints, as encap-
sulated by “a repeated scaling to the right” [209]. The theory of natu-
ral reward is more consistent with the second explanation, because 
it suggests that organisms had to invent novelties that allow capture 
of novel resources. In contrast to the “constraints from the right” 
perspective, however, the theory of natural reward identifies an evo-
lutionary force that is involved with expansion. As applied to the ori-
gin of ecological diversity, the theory of natural reward suggests that 
opportunities continually arose throughout the history of life when 
organisms invented new ways to exploit resources. Each new inno-
vation also typically had spillover effects. For example, each step in 
hierarchical organization opened up adjacent niches [210] for organ-
isms of the same or lower degrees of hierarchical organization (e.g., 
parasites, mutualists and commensalists). The effect of extinction 
may have been to sometimes allow life to overcome plateaus of max-
imal diversity [205]. Although each small step in hierarchical com-
plexity and ecological diversity can be explained by opportunities and 
changes on earth, overall the upward trend required new opportunities 
for novel resource capture allowed by copious energy from the sun.
Another question is why life has increased in total ener-
gy flux or power [211]. According to Lotka [122], life should in-
crease in energy flux because forms that achieve higher energy flux 
will beat those with lower energy flux in direct competition. Thus, 
Lotka’s maximum power principle, as sometimes expounded, may 
be tested by thrusting different sets of species into a direct struggle 
[212]. At a macroevolutionary scale throughout the history of life, 
however, such direct struggles are likely to have been of relatively 
minor importance compared to indirect struggles [32, 60]. An al-
ternative explanation is that as life increases in size and complex-
ity, those at higher rungs of the food chain draw upon a larger total 
amount of energy stored up in the biomass accumulated at lower 
levels. In that case, an overall increase of energy flux is simply an 
incidental consequence of life’s upward expansion to higher levels 
of complexity and not a result of direct competition having domi-
nated macroevolution. However, occasional direct competition with 
merging of continents [69] could reinforce the overall increase by in-
creasing energy flux at a particular hierarchical or trophic level [212]. 
                     
        Reversal of teleology
Williams [213], a staunch critic of teleology pp. 21, 128, recom-
mended that a trait be assumed to have originated by selection for a 
purpose if it appeared designed for that purpose [213], pp. 8–9. Per-
haps the most shocking prediction of the theory of natural reward is 
how it contradicts Williams’ paradigm. The theory of natural reward 
suggests that apparent design in nature, as well as fit between organ-
ism and environment, is not exclusively caused by natural selection 
adapting species to those ends. Instead, it is evidence of natural se-
lection going down blind alleys and creating contraptions without re-
gard to future effects, and of natural reward seizing upon and spread-
ing useful inventions. Natural selection at the end may be responsible 
for fine tuning and specializing adaptations, but much of the fit 
between organism and environment is caused by natural reward. 
What evidence supports this role for natural reward? The 
first line of evidence comes from computer simulations. These simu-
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lations show that the more complex a trait is, and the more features 
of conformity appear contrived for a common goal, the less likely the 
trait originated for a single final cause. The reason is the necessity of 
stepping stone traits that are necessary intermediates between sim-
ple and complex traits [123, 214–217]. As an example from nature, 
feathers [218], bipedal locomotion, and other traits [219], were step-
ping stones for wings that almost certainly originated for a reason 
other than flight (see also [9, 20, 23, 130] for other examples). In one 
particularly illuminating set of computer experiments, Lehman and 
Stanley [216] designed two computer algorithms: one that optimizes 
to the final objective, and another that is a blind novelty search [215]. 
They found that the more complex a trait is, the less likely it could be 
evolved by an optimization algorithm. Only the blind novelty search 
could find the very complex traits because of stepping stones [215, 
216]. This illustrates that natural selection works to produce com-
plex traits as a tinkerer who goes down blind alleys [11, 82], and 
is consistent with the natural reward’s role as nature’s entrepreneur 
(in spreading inventions). It also shows why Williams’ [213] para-
digm, now widely accepted [49, 120], is wrong: the more complex a 
trait is, the less likely it originated for its ultimate apparent purpose.
Another line of evidence for the theory of natural re-
ward comes from studies of complex traits in nature. If the theory 
of natural reward is correct, complex traits will often originate for 
reasons that have nothing to do with their ultimate apparent pur-
pose. An example of such a trait is histocompatibility [23, 220]. 
This trait appears adapted to control the spread of social parasites 
[110, 111, 221, 222]. However, models that break a complex trait 
into simpler components suggest that histocompatibility evolved 
through a historical process, with the final selective pressure being 
to avoid discriminatory conflict [23, 220]. These models suggest 
histocompatibility only incidentally controls social parasites [220]. 
A final line of evidence comes from the artificial dilemmas 
that arise when all fit between organism and environment is assumed 
to be caused by natural selection. Haldane’s dilemma [223] states that 
if an environment changes so rapidly that the species must change in 
multiple characters merely to survive, then the extinction rate should 
be much greater. Anyone who includes in adaptation a connotation 
of origin by selection, however, will be stuck in a perpetual dilemma. 
Haldane’s dilemma is solved if migration can allow organisms to 
continue to track their environments despite environmental change; 
e.g., [224–227]. In these cases, the tracking of species to their envi-
ronments (without expansion) allows continued “fit” even where nat-
ural selection is not powerful enough to do so. In a similar way, natu-
ral reward (with expansion) often achieves a fit with the environment 
by spreading traits into the environments they are fitted to exploit. 
        
    Constraints and carry over
The largest constraints against the theory of natural reward were 
modern assumptions on the requirement for evolution by natural 
selection. Ever since Fisher [228], it became widely assumed that 
the requirement for natural selection is heritable variation in repro-
ductive fitness, usually calculated as some composite of survival 
and fecundity, which may include age structure and other factors 
Figure 7. Crystallized NeoDarwinian framework. Compared to Darwin’s framework (Fig. 1), the NeoDarwin-
ian structure combines resource limitation, the struggle for existence, and the survival of the fittest into a single 
initial concept of differential reproductive fitness. It thus promoted theories suggesting that complex traits originate 
for the ultimate purpose of reproductive fitness maximization or selective benefits to long-preserved units (ital-
ics). In that case, natural selection is a teleological force that explains the major trends of macroevolution (italics). 
1. Differential
    reproductive 
    fitness
2. Natural selection
    (resulting from non-
    random component 
    of differential
    reproductive fitness)
3. Origin of complex traits through slight and successive 
    modifications or origin of complex traits for final 
    purpose of reproductive fitness maximization, or selective benefit to  
    long-preserved species or genes, in which case natural selection 
    acts for ultimate benefits and drives major trends of macroevolution
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[228–230]. This paradigm crystallized the independent assumptions 
of Darwin’s theory (Fig. 1) into a superstructure that could not be 
dissociated into its component parts (Fig. 7). If heritable variation 
in reproductive fitness is all that is necessary for natural selection 
(Fig. 7; [74], p. 458; [75], p. 60; [76], p. 77), then it would appear 
that resource limitation and a struggle for existence are unimport-
ant [231]. Without appreciating the importance of resource limita-
tion (Fig. 1), however, it is impossible to determine the levels and 
time frames of evolution by natural selection (see introduction). It 
is also impossible to extend the theory of evolution to include re-
source abundance, the struggle for supremacy, and natural reward 
(Fig. 2). The first step to extending Darwinism, therefore, is to re-
turn to Darwin’s core framework, which has resource limitation, 
rather than differential reproductive fitness, at its base (Fig. 1).
Next, it is important to understand the impact of the repro-
ductive fitness paradigm, because it will be responsible for most of 
the incumbent resistance to the theory of natural reward. Much the-
ory in biology is based on reproductive fitness [156, 232, 233], and 
the field of philosophy of biology was founded upon it [234], p. 1; 
[235], p. 141. Problems that manifest under the reproductive fitness 
paradigm include the units of selection problem [233], the meaning 
of fitness problem [156, 232], and the utility of inclusive fitness prob-
lem [236]. Below l explain how the theory of natural reward dis-
solves these problems so that sterile controversies can be avoided. 
The first problem is the units of selection problem. The 
problem originally appeared with the new requirements for evolu-
tion (Fig. 7), which obscured Darwin’s explanation for the levels 
and time frames of evolution. Confusion over the units of evolu-
tion stemmed from implicitly conflating the units of force, repro-
duction and competition in a single concept of reproductive fitness 
[229, 232]. Under the theory of natural reward, the unit of force is 
the gene complex, the unit of reproduction is the organism, and the 
unit of competition is the allele or gene complex. Confusion also 
came from applying reproductive fitness concepts to long-term 
evolution [71, 237, 238]. Under the theory of natural reward, this 
confusion is removed because it is possible to separate the roles of 
natural selection and natural reward originating and disseminating 
complex traits. One does not have to formulate a single “reproduc-
tive fitness” quantity that applies to all time frames. By invoking 
three levels of evolutionary units (force, reproduction, and compe-
tition), and distinguishing natural reward and natural selection, the 
theory of natural reward resolves the units of selection problem. 
The meaning of fitness problem, in turn, originated with 
the assumption that there is a reproductive fitness quantity that or-
ganisms maximize [239]. Some theorists assumed the key to under-
standing the origin of complex traits was finding this fitness quantity 
[120, 239, 240]. Despite years of searching for it, however, it was 
never found [239, 241]. Some therefore abandoned the idea that re-
productive fitness maximizes [230, 239], while others abandoned the 
concept of reproductive fitness entirely [242]. The theory of natu-
ral reward suggests that the concept of reproductive fitness should 
be abandoned for three reasons. First, Darwin had no concept of 
reproductive fitness, but instead used fitness to mean adaptedness 
[1, 232]. Second, the theory of natural reward clarifies natural selec-
tion as a short-sighted force. The idea that natural selection works 
for the ultimate purpose of fitness maximization [49, 120, 213, 240] 
came from confusion between Fisher’s analogy to statistical physics 
with an analogy to Newtonian dynamics [237] (and also possibly 
physics envy [71], p. 61). Fisher’s theorem is really about natural 
selection in the extreme short term [237, 243], and has little to say 
about the origin of complex traits compared to Darwin’s historical 
method [9–15, 23, 219]. Third, the theory of natural reward sug-
gests that there is no organismal reproductive fitness quantity that 
natural selection maximizes. Therefore, one can use the simplest 
measure of organismal reproductive success necessary to solve the 
problem at hand. Calling this measure reproductive success sensu 
[244], p. 137, rather than reproductive fitness, is useful because it 
avoids connotations of selection. It must be remembered that natu-
ral reward can also act through organismal reproductive success. 
By abandoning the concept of reproductive fitness, the 
theory of natural reward also abandons the more particular concept 
of inclusive reproductive fitness (hereafter, inclusive fitness). Aban-
doning the concept of inclusive fitness is useful for avoiding con-
fusion. Many social theorists equate Hamilton’s rule with inclusive 
fitness [245–248]. This allows them to take the empirical support for 
kinship theory stimulated by Hamilton’s rule as support for a larger 
teleological paradigm [49] based on reproductive fitness maximi-
zation [120, 240, 248, 249]. In reality, however, Hamilton’s rule is 
separable from inclusive fitness [250]. Hamilton’s rule is a specific 
statement about the benefit of nepotism [23, 220], which can be de-
rived from any modeling framework [250]. Under the theory of natu-
ral reward, Hamilton’s rule can be preserved while inclusive fitness 
and reproductive-fitness-maximization paradigms are abandoned. 
What aspects of former theories carry over? To address this, 
I begin with adaptive landscapes. The adaptive landscape metaphor 
carries over as long as it is restricted in its application. As conceived 
by Dobzhansky [31] with peaks representing species, the adaptive 
landscape can apply to the long-term evolution of simple quantitative 
traits. Here, peak climbing reflects a trend toward some increased val-
ue of a simple trait like body size [32, 71]. However, Dobzhansky’s 
adaptive landscape metaphor does not apply fruitfully to the long-term 
evolution of very complex traits [71, 251]. To explain the long-term 
evolution of very complex traits, it is necessary to break the traits into 
simpler components and apply optimization models to subtraits [1, 
9, 23, 214, 219]. Carrying over from Wrightian adaptive landscapes 
are the ideas that evolutionary advancement involves a trial and er-
ror mechanism at a large scale [252], p. 359, and that advancement 
comes from a process of invention and conquest (dissemination of 
inventions). The theory of natural reward, however, specifies that in-
vention occurs at the level of species rather than deme, and that natu-
ral selection plays a much greater role than drift in assembling inven-
tions (compared to Wright [252] but similar to Wright [200–202]).
With respect to former frameworks of major transitions, 
two aspects carry over. First, there are many types of evolutionary 
innovations that have contributed to major ecological expansions, 
including those involved with individuality [110], cooperation [111, 
112], heredity [105], metabolism [253], energy utilization [254], and 
various other traits [255–257]. Formerly, some authors pitted the-
matic reviews of evolutionary innovations against each other [105, 
110, 112, 258]. However, it will be more useful to ask how some 
types of innovations synergize, or how understanding some may 
help illuminate others. A second aspect of major-transition theo-
ries carrying over is that devoted to explaining the origin of repro-
ducers [259–261]. Cells, multicellular organisms, and societies all 
reproduce. The relevant question is how reproduction originates 
by shifts in life cycles [262–264], and how novel reproducers are 
maintained as genetically discrete units with fusion-rejection sys-
tems [23, 110, 220]. Some former arguments [110, 156, 265] may 
be recast in terms of transitions in units of reproduction [260]. 
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Third, the theory of natural reward will also help re-
populate some areas of research by returning them to core Dar-
winian foundations. The field most likely affected is social theory. 
As mentioned above, social theorists conflated Hamilton’s rule 
and inclusive fitness, suggesting Hamilton’s rule is a sort of gen-
eral theorem of reproductive fitness. This paradigm led to confu-
sion between cause and effect, and between elementary forms of 
social behavior [220, 266]. Reorganizing social theory around 
a Darwinian historical–comparative approach [1, 9, 11, 106], 
which specifies a narrow role for Hamilton’s rule, and which es-
tablishes a healthier link between general theory and empirical 
work [106], will allow for major progress in this field [23, 220]. 
  
             Appeal to experts 
Several other factors may provide a roadblock for experts. A first 
factor may be the assumption that innovation requires saltation. 
This assumption dates back to Darwin, who argued that a finding of 
graduated steps leading to complex characters disproves a role of a 
Creator, and thus a role for innovation or “real novelty” in evolution 
[1], pp. 194, 471; and [267], p. 509. The assumption that innova-
tion requires saltation has led authors advocating novel theories to 
often unnecessarily advocate saltationism [38, 40]. Recently, authors 
discussing genetics of macroevolution created an unnecessary di-
chotomy between their perspectives and classical theories of small 
incremental changes [77], p. 796, or uniformitarianism [268, 269]. 
Those defending Darwinism, in turn, have assumed that a ruling 
out of saltationism disproves the importance of separate analyses 
of macroevolutionary genetics [36], p. 969; [37] p. 475; [270, 271]; 
[272], p. 39. Under the theory of natural reward, however, innovation 
does not require saltation. Inventions can originate gradually and en-
trepreneurship can still be important for spreading inventions. Thus, 
ruling out saltation does not disprove natural reward as a force of na-
ture, nor does it suggest that we should ignore the structure of hierar-
chical gene networks that give insights on macroevolution [77, 270]. 
Another constraining factor comes from the opinion that 
if Darwinian competition does not dominate macroevolution, then 
macroevolution must be governed by chance. This opinion is sup-
ported by two dichotomies. The first is between Red Queen (Darwin-
ian) models of direct biotic competition, and Court Jester models of 
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Figure 8. The long-lost meaning of the only figure in The Origin. The key point of this figure is hidden in plain sight. The initially variable 
species, A and I, differentially give rise to more descendant species (14) than do the nonvariable species B–H and K–L (1). Darwin hypoth-
esized that variable species would differentially evolve traits allowing seizure of unoccupied or ill-occupied places in the economy of nature, 
expand and diversify, and avoid extinction. Thus, the differential success of variable species would explain widespread variation in nature, 
and also suggest long-term progress in evolution toward increased ability to diverge in character (or in modern terms, increased evolvability 
redrawn from [1]). In editions 1–4, only some of the nonvariable species go extinct. In edition 5, Darwin changed his wording so that all of 
the nine nonvariable species go extinct (p. 135 of 4th and p. 137 of 5th). 
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abiotic factors [273]. From the perspective of this dichotomy, a strong 
role for unpredictable abiotic factors causing climate change or ex-
tinction suggests a strong role for chance rather than deterministic 
forces in macroevolution [273, 274]. This dichotomy ignores, how-
ever, that abiotic events can promote indirect competition [61]. The 
second dichotomy assumes that a finding of a strong role for histori-
cal contingency in the origin of complex traits means that it is gov-
erned by chance [206, 214, 275]. Under the theory of natural reward, 
however, a strong role for chance and contingency in the long-term 
origin of inventions is fully consistent with natural selection acting as 
nature’s tinkerer. Natural reward acts as a non-random entrepreneur-
ial force on the random variation of invention thus provided (Fig. 6). 
Evolutionists have also been held back by the opinion, 
tracing back to Dobzhansky [31], p.77, that Darwin’s metaphors like 
the struggle for existence and survival of the fittest were not integral 
to his argument [231]. Many authors have reiterated Dobzhansky’s 
idea that Darwin’s metaphors had the unnecessary consequence of 
suggesting an “eat-or-be-eaten” world. Within this caricature, natu-
ral selection is supposed to favor only the most selfish and aggres-
sive individuals through differential mortality of others. Dobzhansky 
also claimed that such metaphors caused the misuse of Darwinism 
by propagandists and bigots. Upon this backdrop, evolutionists jus-
tify the substitution of the neoDarwinian framework (Fig. 7) for the 
Darwinian one (Fig. 1). However, if the struggle for existence occurs 
among alleles, then natural selection acting on genotypes leads to 
differential net reproductive success of organisms, whether differen-
tial fecundity or mortality is the relevant cause. This can cause the 
survival of altruistic or meek alleles, not just selfish or aggressive al-
leles. Thus, Darwin’s assumptions, when properly used, do not nec-
essarily imply a “eat-or-be-eaten” world. They also do not preclude 
selection operating through differential fecundity or fertility rather 
than mortality. Finally, there is no evidence that Darwin’s metaphors 
were responsible for misuse of his theory. Rather, incorrect appli-
cations of Darwinism to fields like economics [276] was probably 
caused by a failure to see the complete picture offered by the theory 
of natural reward (more discussion of this awaits a future work). 
A final question for experts is how the theory of natural re-
ward relates to Darwin’s macroevolutionary arguments. I suggest that 
the theory of natural reward helps reveal the hidden meaning of the 
only figure in The Origin of Species (Fig. 8). Fig. 8 shows two large 
fans representing variable species, which have a propensity to evolve 
and adapt, or “diverge in character”, expanding and diversifying, and 
replacing the nonvariable species. Darwin’s main argument was that 
the more variable species would tend to evolve traits allowing sei-
zure of new resources, and thus heritable variability, or tendency to 
vary [1], p. 118; [59], pp. 252, 255, would be favored by a long-term 
effect on expansion. Under Darwin’s argument, heritable variability 
allowed adaptation, adaptation allowed population expansion, and 
population expansion allowed speciation (Fig. 9). Therefore, vari-
ability was ultimately favored for its long-term effect on expansion.
Although Darwin’s argument for increased variability 
seems obvious when stated simply, it has not been understood by 
modern evolutionists. There are four proximate reasons for this. 
First, Darwin used his figure for three other purposes: to explain 
the origin of higher taxa through phyletic branching [277], as a 
model to explain how species diverge in character given variation 
exists [278, 279], and how specialization can lead to an increase 
in the number of species on a given resource base [278, 280]. The 
primary message was lost in the secondary messages. Second, al-
though Darwin argued that the specialization that occurs with spe-
ciation feeds back to increase population expansion further (Fig. 9), 
he also argued that the number of species is ultimately limited by 
Figure 9. Meaning of the principle of divergence.  Conceptual foundation of Darwin's principle of divergence. The entire argument is found in 
[59]. For further details, see: 1. Wallace [278], pp. 105–111. 2. Worster [279], pp. 160. 3. Darwin [1] pp. 104–107. 4. Lyell [4], pp. xiiv-xiv, 327, 459. 
5. Fisher [228] 1930, p. 2. 6. Tammone [280], p. 111; Worster [279], p. 160; Gould [38], p. 224.
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decreasing returns to specialization and ability to evolve by natu-
ral selection as populations fragment with speciation [59], pp. 247–
248. Most modern evolutionists have not gripped Darwin’s entire 
conceptual scheme, because he did not present the whole thing in 
The Origin. Third, in contrast to modern investigators, Darwin as-
sumed inheritance was blending and searched for factors that would 
introduce variation back into populations [228], p. 2. For Darwin, 
the principle of divergence was such a mechanism. Finally, Darwin 
presented what he perceived to be the evidence for his theory, that 
larger genera tend to have more variable species than smaller gen-
era, before he presented his theory of divergence itself [1], pp. 54–
60, 113–127. This was a very confusing way to present the theory. 
Because of their failure to understand his arguments, most 
neoDarwinists interpreted Darwin’s principle of divergence as some-
thing more familiar. Their major focus was on forms of speciation 
(sympatric, allopatric, etc. [203]), so they interpreted the principle of 
divergence as sympatric speciation [281–284]. From Darwin’s per-
spective, however, the key to understanding the origin of species is 
not the particular type of speciation, but evolvability and expansion. 
Darwin’s principle of divergence predicts that variability allows the 
evolution of new advantageous characters, population expansion, 
and speciation (Fig. 9). In contrast, a lack of variability ultimately 
leads to population decline and extinction (Fig. 9). Thus, evolvability 
was key to long-term success. In agreement with Darwin, modern 
research shows that variation in speciation rates correlate with rates 
of evolution general morphologies [285], and of various ecologically 
relevant traits [286], pp. 419–421; [287], but not variation in isolat-
ing mechanisms [288]. A shift in focus from types of speciation to 
innovativeness may yield deeper insights on the origin of species. 
Ultimately, Darwin’s macroevolutionary theory was ob-
scure because it was incomplete. To explain long-term evolutionary 
advancement, it is necessary to identify a separate struggle and alter-
native evolutionary force. Thus when Darwin explained his theory 
to Lyell [4], pp. xiiv–xiv, 327, 459, Lyell responded by emphasizing 
what was obvious to many of Darwin’s contemporaries [289], pp. 
63–64; [290]; [57], pp. 207–208: Darwin’s theory raised bigger ques-
tions than it answered. Lyell [8] thus referred to Darwin’s theory as 
“one of those humble advances which we may be permitted to make,” 
and cautioned that investigators should, “not be discouraged because 
greater mysteries remain behind wholly inscrutable to us” [291] pp. 
365–366. Alfred Wallace [292], the co-developer of the theory of 
natural selection, also concluded that, “some more general and more 
fundamental law underlies that of natural selection...” [292], p. 360. 
We now see that these authors were correct. Darwin could 
not answer the bigger questions because he was ignorant of the form 
of competition most relevant to macroevolution, the role of mass ex-
tinctions, and modern theories of economic growth. He also lived at 
a time when technological progress was relatively slow compared to 
today. Darwin thus lacked the language and metaphors necessary to 
convey the theory of natural reward (Fig. 3 and Table 2). Therefore, 
just as theories of evolution lacking natural selection could not ex-
plain adaptation prior to Darwin [28], neither could Darwin explain 
progress and advancement without the theory of natural reward.
  
   Conclusions  
Darwin’s theory of evolution suggested that some sort of progress and 
advancement occurred, but it did not explain it. Therefore, a large part 
of the evolutionary history remained very murky, and this murkiness 
allowed for two possible interpretations of Darwinism. In the first, 
natural selection is a short-sighted force that works for the immediate 
benefits, and only through slight and successive modification. In the 
second, natural selection is a long-sighted force that works for the 
ultimate benefits of organismal fitness maximization or selection on 
long-preserved units (e.g., genes, species, or clades). The theory of 
natural reward teaches us that only the first interpretation of Darwin’s 
theory is correct. The theory of natural reward also extends Darwinism 
to explain the apparently progressive trends that must have occurred 
if Darwin’s theory were true. It suggests that the broad-scale history 
of life is best encapsulated not as survival of the fittest, but as success 
of the innovative. The theory of natural reward may also yield impor-
tant connections between biology and economics not covered here.
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